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Abstract 
There are forces which, by acting over a long time frame and by remaining almost 
unaltered, leave traces in societies and nations that make them more or less prone to 
certain behaviours. These marks include physical geography, which is like the stage of 
history and exerts a profound influence on it. Europeans today face challenges that result 
from their own perceptions and different cultural habits forged by centuries or even 
thousands of years of conflicts brought about by religion, tribal views or linguistic barriers, 
reinforced by the compartmentalized division of the territory, by the existence, or lack of it, 
of large waterways, and by the mildness or rigour of the climate.    
In fact, the union of Europe, which was often attempted by force, found a new impetus with 
the end of World War 2, leading to a peaceful construct unprecedented in history. However, 
as this union expanded and deepened, the aggregating cement that held Europe together 
has degraded, appearing not to withstand the winds of the crises well. We will only be able 
to strengthen what unites us when we gain awareness of what divides us.  
Portugal, a country which is almost one thousand years old and which has validated itself 
outside Europe from an early age, is facing yet another crisis for survival. Understanding the 
possible ways-out beyond the “mist of the days” and the politically correct has now become 
an exercise of citizenship. 
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To many off guard observers, including senior politicians, it seemed that the EU 
enlargement to the East made possible by the implosion of the Soviet bloc represented 
the reunion of Geopolitics with the History of Europe. Almost 20 years later, what we 
see is a multifaceted reality, largely selfish and nationalistic, anchored in ancient roots 
which, by contrast, seem to be anxious to demonstrate, again, that in the European 
continent, the encounter of Geopolitics with History does not usually have a happy 
ending.  
In fact, nowadays the future of the European Union seems much darker than it was 
then. One only needs to read the papers or hear the news to understand that the 
financial crisis has prompted a resurgence of old selfishness and that the faith of many 
Europeans in the future of the Union has been shaken,1even more so after the “cold 
shower” that, not so long ago, the rejection by the French and Dutch of an important 
step towards European integration represented. Nowadays, we also have important 
fringes of population from some nations in the North and the South questioning the 
benefits of remaining part of a union that brings, to some, such high costs, and, to 
others, hard sacrifices. However, there is little to be surprised about.  
Indeed, societies are a complex product. If, on the one hand, the causal links are 
difficult to establish, on the other the wide margin of uncertainty that characterizes all 
human action can lead in different directions. It seems indisputable that there is a set 
of circumstances which, acting in the long term, shape them with particular features 
that without determining their course, make them more or less prone to particular 
behaviours. They are the deep forces, according to the extremely appropriate definition 
of Pierre Renouvin.2 Besides those, but not all, considered by Renouvin,3 other forces 
he did not taken into account are included here, as the author of this paper believes 
them to be essential in the framework of this analysis4:  
They are: History (with its myths, its solidarities, its self-image and its hostilities), 
“Temperament” (cultural habits, the level of rigidity of society, the attitude to power 
and adversity), Language (a true oral genome which, like some people argue, helps to 
structure thinking), Religion (with its codes of conduct, favouring certain behaviours 
and values, while disfavouring others), infra-national social forms, such as the Clan, 
                                                      
1  Among others, there are the many comments made by Ambassador Cutileiro in Expresso, particularly in 
the 14 May 2011 edition, where a vast number of writers gives rein to their pessimism; there is also the 
declarations made by former Chancellor Kohl when he received the Henry Kissinger prize from the 
American Academy in Berlin (May 2011), or what José Ignacio Torreblanca, Director of the Madrid Office 
of the European Council on Foreign Relations wrote in May (in 25-05-11). 
2  Pierre Renouvin (1991). «Les Forces Profondes» in Introduction à L’Histoire des Relations Internationale, 
Paris: Armand Colin, 4th Ed. 
3  Renouvin considered as Deep Forces the geographical factors, demographic conditions, economic and 
financial forces, the national sentiment, nationalisms, and the pacifist sentiment. 
4  Nogueira, José Manuel Freire (2011). O Método Geopolítico Alargado – Persistências e Contingências em 
Portugal e no Mundo, Lisbon: IESM. 
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The Tribe and Ethnicity  (where societies, even those supposedly more advanced, 
regress to at times of crisis), to which it seems advantageous to add, besides the 
relevant data on Human Geography and the key aspects of the situation, the almost 
unchanged scenario where the lives of societies unfold, that is, Physical Geography, the 
basis of the geopolitical analysis method.5 
Europe constitutes an excellent case study.  
Having been inhabited for thousands of years by relatively stable peoples whose 
history is quite well known, it is obvious that its political geography lies in factors that 
make it different from other regions in the world but which also translate into profound 
internal differences. . 
In effect, the History of Europe is quite turbulent as it is made of regionalisms that 
consistently resist the imperial dreams which, with some regularity, reappear on its 
stage. With the exception of the Roman Empire (which just dominated the 
Mediterranean basin and the temperate parts of Western Europe) or that of the 
Habsburgs, who exercised a relatively weak power over Central Europe, none of them 
stayed beyond the ephemeral.  
Charlemagne, Charles V, France in the 17th and 18th centuries, Napoleon, Hitler, all of 
them leaders of continental empires, stumbled at the thirst for national or even 
regional autonomy that seems to characterize Europeans and that even finds an 
explanation, among many others, in the thesis of the French Castex on the 
“Continental disturber l”,6 which foresaw the defeat of the continental hegemonic 
impulses. 
Indeed, it was not in vain that feudalism could persist in Europe for almost one 
thousand years, or that Germany was divided into more than three hundred political 
units until its unification in the nineteenth century, and that Italy has only united and 
consolidated itself as a country in recent times, or that, even now, Europe is the 
continent with the second largest number of states, despite its small size. It is not in 
vain also that the modern nation-state was invented by the Europeans, and that this 
invention was subsequently exported to the rest of the world, as disunity and 
cantonalism seem to be the historical matrix of the Europeans, with war being one of 
their most enduring institutions. National (and even regional) hatreds and self-interest 
resurface when they seemed appeased. This deep force is one that is dangerous to 
ignore.  
This is because Europeans are profoundly different from each other. Their cultural 
matrix was formed over a long process that emphasized their differences. In the 
South, the mercy of nature enabled the early flowering of a civilization. In a clear 
demonstration of the theory of “challenge and response” advanced by Toynbee,7 
Southern Europeans did not have to face wild beasts or the hardships of nature, for 
which reason the pressure to act as a group was much less than that exerted on 
                                                      
5  This has little, if anything, to do with the common meaning of the word Geopolitics, a term that was 
misappropriated by Henry Kissinger in the seventies – and which he never defined – and which has 
become a sort of synonymous with he use of power in international relations, creating a terminological 
confusion that only promotes ignorance. For this, the word strategy, or even its extreme, geostrategy, 
already existed and still does. 
6  Castex, Raoul (1935). Théories Stratégiques, V, Paris. 
7  Toynbee, Arnold (1934.1961). A Study of History, 12 volumes, Oxford University Press. 
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Europeans from the North, where individual survival depended on the strength of the 
group. Even today, selfish individualism and disorganization are trademarks of the 
south, whereas discipline and organization dominates in the north.  
Portuguese professor Políbio de Almeida (1932-2008), when trying to define the 
behaviour of the three European major ethnic groups (Slavic, Germanic and Latin), 
pointed out that the amorphousness typical of the individual German ends when he 
becomes part of a group. Accordingly, whereas association is the source of fulfilment, 
for Latin people it becomes the opposite, a cause for suspicion. The individualism of the 
latter is confused with pride, vanity and a desire to stand out even at the expense of 
the group he may belong to. Pointing to the geography of southern Europe as a 
structuring force, Políbio de Almeida went as far as to affirm that the sociability of the 
Latin people is limited to small groups and is averse to centralized planning.8 
The work of Dutch social psychologist Hofstede9 shows similar characteristics, albeit 
from a different perspective. The “power distance” (which in his view meant the degree 
of rigidity of society in which the influence of status at birth determines social position, 
among other things), was, in his opinion, most prevalent in societies where the Roman 
tradition prevailed, and lower in those where German egalitarianism was deeply 
rooted.    
Events in England seem to be a clear demonstrator of the arguments advanced by the 
social psychologist. In that part of Europe, the legions called by Emperor Honorius in 
402 to defend Rome eventually never returned. The withdrawal, at first believed to be 
temporary, became a definitive one, leaving the Britons powerless against the 
incursions of the Saxons and the Angles, who, after the fall of Rome, transformed their 
raids into migration. The society of the Britons disappeared in a short time, because 
unlike other parts of the former empire, in Britain there was no assimilation between 
the Roman-Britons and the new Germanic lords.   
The traces of the German order were banished and replaced by a more primitive, yet 
more egalitarian German society. Hofstede stresses that among the Germans, the 
power of the chief was subordinate to the assembly of free men. In his view, this was 
an historical indicator of reduced power distance. Much later, in 1215, King John, in 
conflict with his barons, granted the Magna Carta. As pointed out by Hofstede, this 
document, considered to be the founder of English liberties, represents the victory of 
the rights of free men following the old tradition of the Germanic peoples.10 The small 
power distance thus plunged deeply into the history of England.  
The high need “to control uncertainty” (the need to predict and codify everything) 
common to all Latin peoples and much less present in peoples from the North also 
derives from the Roman tradition. Hofstede also highlights two other factors: the 
existence of strong “individualism” in the North (up-frontness in relationships and 
acceptance that there are winners and losers) as well as high “masculinity” (with the 
glorification of competition and success, and the severe punishment of offenders), 
which opposes the “femininity” (which avoids confrontation and humiliation) that is 
characteristic of societies in the South.    
                                                      
8  Almeida, Políbio de (1994). “A casa comum europeia” in Ensaios de Geopolítica, Lisboa: ISCSP: 211-216. 
9  Hofstede, Geert (1980). Culture´s consequences: international differences in work-related values. 
London: Sage Publications. 
10  Hofstede, op. cit: 100. 
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Language is another distinctive feature. Although derived from the major Indo-
European group, European languages have come to differ to a greater or lesser extent 
(as part of a process made deeper by the large migrations of the first millennium) in 
such a way that each language soon became intelligible even to its closest neighbours, 
thus leading to the development of a “linguistic cantonalism”11 that strengthened local 
identities which, in some cases, joined together as nations at a later stage, often 
through the imposition of a common language. Hence the growing need for a lingua 
franca for communicating among different groups and which, generally speaking, was 
only at the reach of the elites, with the own language being used for communicating 
within their own group.  
Such was the role of Latin, French and nowadays clearly that of English which, for the 
first time, is within reach of a large mass of individuals. Tellingly, it is a European 
language, but it is as if it was from extra European origin, since the reasons for 
adopting it are related to the huge power of the United States, where the cultural 
models, fashions, management criteria, and military power stem from. It must be 
noted that the same language, when used by the British at a time when they had 
power similar to that held by Americans today, never played a major international role 
as an international communication vehicle outside the country.  
Religion, in turn, having shaped identities, was also the reason for the largest 
fractures.  
The religious matrix of Europe is undoubtedly Judeo-Christian. After having penetrated 
Roman society, Christianity only took three centuries to spread through the 
Mediterranean world and in the areas on the edge of olive and vine producing lands. 
Indeed, the Catholic rite is closely tied to bread (wheat), wine (grapes) and olive oil 
(olive trees), which in fact means to a specific geographical area.12 Its expansion to the 
north even forced the expansion of vines into Belgium and England, in contradiction 
with the requirements of their natural vegetations, to meet the needs of celebrating 
mass. However, as noted by French geographer Albert Demangeon,13 as transport 
became cheaper, the cultivation of vineyards soon retreated to areas more suitable to 
their needs in terms of vegetation and ripening: the sunny south.  
Many years later, with the demise of the Middle Ages, Rome’s Pope-obeying 
Christianity faced deep tensions that eventually ended in rupture that approximately 
followed the ancient northern borders of the Roman Empire, which was a very old and 
strong line of cultural divide. To the north of this line, in general, the Reformation 
implemented Protestantism and a distinct way of seeing the world, without obedience 
to the Roman papacy. This was where a type of society, with much more simple and 
austere rites unconnected to Mediterranean geography, in a colder and more rigid 
Europe – how not to think about geography – developed and ended up playing a major 
role in the world.    
Max Weber, rightly or wrongly, even saw the reason for the birth of the capitalist spirit 
in that separation. According to him, by sanctifying work and daily life instead of 
                                                      
11  Even today, local dialects spoken by small groups coexist with the official languages of the states. This is 
the case, in Portugal, of the Mirandês, which is officially recognized. 
12  Chauprade, Aymeric (2003). Géopolitique, constantes et changements dans l’histoire, Paris: Ellipses: 
298.  
13  Demangeon, Albert (1952). Problèmes de Geographie Humaine, Paris: Armand Colin. 
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waiting for the reward after death, Protestantism, alongside the advancement of 
science, contributed to the “decriminalization” of profit and to the sanctification of 
work. He completes his opinion by saying that almost all big businessmen from 
Germany in his days were Protestant, mainly Calvinists.14  
In Southeast Europe, a third division, also the result of ancient cultural boundaries 
stemming from the Great Schism which, following intractable conflict between the 
Emperor of the East and the Pope and which mirrored the clash between the Greco-
Byzantine and the Latin-German worlds, led to the division in 1054, to this day, of the 
two churches, with the Orthodox Church becoming subordinate to the Patriarch of 
Constantinople. When Constantinople fell under Turkish rule (1453), the head of 
orthodoxy moved to Kiev and then to Moscow. Thus, we have at least three or four 
“Europes”. The role of infra-national forms of organization, even the most basic, is not 
smaller. The kinship-based clan is a structured basic human group which is both the 
oldest and the first – when territorialized – to have a proto-geopolitical meaning. In 
this case, it is inside the clan that the first social relationship between humans and 
their territories takes place. In other words, it is within the clan that the embryo of 
geopolitics is generated. Successively grouped into tribes and ethnic groups, clans still 
exist in a few human societies, as is the case in some parts of Africa or that example 
well-known in the Western world provided by the famous Scottish clans which, even 
today, have a surprising degree of cohesion. As for the tribe, it is less cohesive than 
the clan because it is the result of the junction of several clans. It carried the germ of 
political cohesion and is rightly considered as such. Indeed, the first political 
manifestations as we see them today – one people, one head, one territory – coincide 
with tribal organizations. Tribes eventually became federated into nations. But this was 
a very long process and the coincidence of national borders with the borders of the 
states is a relatively recent phenomenon. Inheritance, historical or conquest rights 
slowly overlapped the “right of peoples to self-determination”, and it was only in the 
wake of the social and political changes triggered by the French Revolution that the so-
called “springtime of peoples” began. Hailed as the primary cause of war (well 
expressed in several of the famous 14 points of President Wilson15), the mismatch 
between the State and the Nation was severely restricted after the First World War, 
when the political map of Europe (as elsewhere in the world) was redesigned at 
international conferences. However, in the contemporary world, many states are not 
formed by a single nation, let alone by a single ethnic group. It is true that outside 
Europe, some states – true artificial constructs – are even directly formed by tribes 
whose only connection is that of a conglomerate. 
Indeed, when artificially grouped into states, many ethnic groups cannot resist the 
social, demographic, political and religious tensions that occur, often independently of 
human will. History, including contemporary history, is filled with inter-ethnic conflicts. 
But the deep resistance of primitive forms of human organization is better 
demonstrated in places where the state proves to be took weak to perform its basic 
function - failed states - and where societies regress to their more primitive identities, 
                                                      
14  Weber, Max (2001). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Portuguese translation,    
Barcarena: Presença (orig. from 1920). 
15  Snell, John L. (1954). "Wilson on Germany and the Fourteen Points", in The Journal of Modern History, 
Vol. 26, No. 4, The University of Chicago Press, Dec.: 364-369. 
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be them the ethnic group, the tribe or even the clan. The shattering of the former 
Yugoslavia and, more recently, the events in Libya, are a daunting example for all 
those who believed in the inexorable march of progress.  
Finally comes physical geography and, within it, first, the climatic factors. Historian 
David Landes spoke at length on this subject.16 According to him, Europe, particularly 
its western part, enjoys privileged conditions: the winters are cold enough to prevent 
the spread of diseases and gently enough to foster a good balance between inhabitants 
and the environment. Rainfall is distributed throughout the year., creating fertility 
conditions rarely found elsewhere. It was this same uniform and moderately abundant 
supply of water, combined with low rates of evaporation, which freed the Europeans 
from prevailing tyranny, namely the “river civilizations”, where the necessary irrigation 
works generated central and authoritarian powers that Europe has not known.  
These exceptional conditions favoured Europeans with good and relatively uniform 
harvests, combined with large herds and dense forests. This almost unique 
combination gave rise to sedentary civilizations that raised cattle and which have 
proven to be bigger and stronger than the rest of the world, in addition to producing 
natural fertilizer healthier than the one used in Asia, based on human faeces. The 
powerful European horse was thus able to carry the heavy medieval knight, was 
supreme in charges, and for many years unbeatable in conventional combat.17 It was 
also the strength of European animals that allowed more efficient heavy work and the 
transport of goods, as well as, at a later stage and with enormous impact, the towing 
of artillery to the battlefield.  
As a result, European had access to a richer diet, growing increasingly stronger and 
relatively free from the worms that plagued China and India. Accordingly, not only 
animals but also human beings were stronger. The European domination, which later 
spread throughout the world, was frequently due to the inequalities of nature.  
However, this strength is also the result of other stimuli. Paul Kennedy, the renowned 
author of “The Rise and Fall of Great Powers” points out that, in the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, no one would believe that the small states of Western Europe would 
impose themselves on the major centres of power that existed at the time: Ming China, 
the Ottoman Empire, the Mongol Empire, Muscovy, and Japan. It was the absence of a 
single central authority - which Kennedy sees as the happy result of the fall of the 
Roman Empire and of the compartmentalized geographical features of Europe, where 
there are no dominating large plains or huge water basins surrounded by fertile lands 
capable of imposing uniformity of thought - that was responsible for the huge degree 
of freedom and for the relatively few barriers to change that led to the  spiral of 
scientific and technical progress that led to the supremacy of the West.18 
With such tools, it is not surprising that during an extended period of time Europe 
dominated the world. However, the strength of the Europeans turned against them and 
                                                      
16  Landes, David S. (2005). The Wealth and Poverty of Nations – Why are some so rich and others so poor , 
Portuguese version Lisbon: Gradiva, 7th Edition (original edition from 1998). 
17  In particular they stopped the Muslim onslaught towards Central Europe – which used light Arabian 
horses – at the Battle of Poitiers in 732. In 1187, the Muslims had their revenge when the knights of 
Saladin, mounted on light horses, destroyed at Hattin a force of crusaders mounted on heavy armoured 
horses that had carried their heavy riders throughout the day under scorching sun.   
18  Kennedy, Paul (1987). The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random House, New York: 3-30. 
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also encouraged their rivalries. Even a cursory look at history shows that the peoples 
of Europe seem to have never aspired to large unions.  
Having looked at the non-geographical and climatic (albeit strongly influenced by 
physical geography) aspects that seem to lie at the root of this situation, it is time to 
examine physical geography, whose continuity is everywhere in Europe, as elsewhere 
in the world, where it continues to act as a deep force. It must be pointed out that 
there are large islands near Europe whose critical mass is enough to generate island 
nations, with their typical sense of exception and isolation. This applies particularly to 
Great Britain, which was the seat of maritime power, embodying Europe’s superiority 
while keeping itself on the flank of the continent.  
There are also a number of large peninsulas in Europe, and it is known that they tend 
to become autonomous from mainland19or even unite politically.20 Indeed, all great 
peninsulas in Europe have long been the home of one or more independent states, the 
latter being justified by geographical barriers (such as in Scandinavia) or by cultural 
ones (like the Iberian Peninsula). Opening up to the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, they 
all have been home to maritime powers and have the typical mentality of these powers 
which, about 2500 years ago, caught the attention of Greek historian Thucydides21, and 
which differs greatly from the continental mindset that prevails in the centre of Europe.  
In the same fashion, the topography of Europe is characterized by the abundance of 
mountain ranges that either compartmentalize space (this is the case of the Pyrenees, 
amongst many others) or are zones where mountain people have settled (like in 
Switzerland). In any case, for thousands of years they have constituted physical 
barriers hampering easy movement, also facilitating defence and thus impeding the 
great empires. They also give origin to true “cultural cantons”, since the mountain 
culture tends to differ from the one that usually dominates the plain. Among other 
reasons, it was this topography that enabled small – sometimes minute – political units 
to subsist to this day. These are marks that progress will eventually fade away, but 
that cannot be ignored.  
The river basins of Europe also have a role to play, as well demonstrated by German 
geographers in the first half of the twentieth century. In the absence of a structuring 
large river like the Nile, the Euphrates, or the Yellow River, Europe’s powers and wealth 
concentrated over several large navigable rivers which allowed the movement of goods 
at low prices. The Danube has Vienna, the Po has Milan, the Rhine has Amsterdam and 
Frankfurt, and the Thames has London.22 
Again, geography separates the North and South of Europe which, with the exception of 
the Po valley, has no major river that can be used for trade purposes. As a possible 
consequence, the people of the South, when they developed their own business, they 
did so from a distance and by sea, disadvantaged by nature, which did not give them 
the possibility of linking their ports to the interior which otherwise could have 
happened. Accordingly, northern Europe became more urban, industrialized and 
technocratic, whereas the South tended to be more rural, agricultural and less 
                                                      
19  Ratzel, Friedrich (1987). La Géographie Politique, Fayard: 107. 
20  Chauprade, Aymeric, op.cit: 126-153. 
21  Thucydides (2010). History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Raul Rosado Fernandes and 
Grabriela Granwher, Lisbon: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. 
22  Zeihan, Peter (2010). STATFOR, 21 December. 
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developed in terms of industry. In a world that emphasizes the values of the north, the 
formerly civilized and refined south has, for now, become a kind of periphery.  
Therefore, there are several “Europes” and, within them, a wide range of states which, 
having withstood the vicissitudes of history, jealously retain their prerogatives as 
nation-states. There was no lack of ambition to impose unity by force. But even when 
its military power was overwhelming, it all stumbled upon the defiance of those who 
insisted on becoming independent.  
The last two attempts of a military nature came from Germany, and its own power was 
so strong that it took extra-European interventions to restore the previous order, or at 
least something resembling it. Again, in the latest attempt, this time not military 
oriented, Germany was the one of the key drivers. A little analytical retreat at this point 
seems appropriate to better understand it.  
The Germans, who suffered from large scale “European-type cantonalism” until 1870, 
started to move towards their own unity with a customs union which, by encouraging 
common geographical and cultural factors, soon produced the desired results. It was 
perhaps too successful, inasmuch as, as soon as Germany became the main European 
power (its population grew 65 percent between 1871 and 1914 and on the eve of World 
War I, Germany produced twice as much steel as Great Britain …23) and soon denoted 
hegemonic ambitions.  
It was a dream that went wrong, and defeated Germany was forced to sign the 
humiliating treaty of Versailles in 1919, which was a sore for the country’s national 
pride. The purpose of war, set in September 1914 by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, 
was to form a customs union extending from France to Poland, keeping Great-Britain 
and Russia apart from the European continent, which was theorized by Friedrich 
Nauman (1860-1919) in 1915 in his book Mitteleuropa,24 and failed completely. 
When Germany was admitted to the League of Nations in 1926, its pacifist government, 
which wrestled with profound internal problems and the demons of revanchism, soon 
proposed (1929) the creation of the United States of Europe through Gustav 
Stresemann25. 
Nevertheless, in that same year, the crash of the New York Stock Exchange plunged 
the world into a full-blown crisis and also silenced the voices of common sense, 
releasing the demons of nationalism and racism. Ten years later, the world watched the 
launch of the greatest catastrophe in history. It led not only to another defeat of 
Germany (again, it took the entire world to overwhelm it) but also to the ruin of Europe 
and to its decline on the world stage.  
Even during the war, German lawyers built what they believed to be a new model of 
relations among states. It encompassed some of the most permanent and negative 
matrixes of German ideas. Written by jurist Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), who led the War 
Institute for Politics and International Law, the project Treaty between Germany, Italy 
                                                      
23  Desfargues, Philipe Moureau (2003). Introdução à Geopolítica, Lisbon: Gradiva: 70-71. 
24  It corresponds to Central Europe. Nevertheless, in addition to anticipating the direct political control of 
almost the entire region, the concept advocated Germany’ economic control up to the Caucasus 
(including also the Ukraine and the Balkans)and could extend to Bagdad.  
25  Gustav Stresemann (1878-1929), Chancellor in 1923 and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany between 
1923 and 1929. Nobel Prize winner in 1926 together with his French counterpart Aristide Briand, due to 
his role in the Treaty of Locarno. 
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and Japan on the configuration of Large Areas in Europe and Greater East Asia, drew a 
world that was remarkably different from the one that came to be established by the 
Declaration of St. Francisco and the principles of Bretton Woods.26 
The Large Areas were to be articulated in Communities of States under the guidance of 
a Directing State that reserved the right to impose, within its limitations, its own 
political conditions. Thus, a less unitary entity than the state, albeit a more cohesive 
one, would emerge.27 Under the Directing State of Each Community of States there 
would be independent states with limited sovereignty. In theory, the adhesion of these 
States – to which every state geographically located inside the Large Area – would be 
done on a volunteer basis and conducted by a bilateral treaty between the Directing 
State and each of the acceding states (article 3). Relations with non-members would be 
governed by International Law.   
In an interesting preview, the Treaty referred to the existence and recognition of 
International Law, the Domestic Law of States and created a new figure within each 
Community of States: Community Law. It is clear that the use of this figure by the 
enemies of the idea of European Community conceals, in fact, the huge difference 
between the two concepts: the accession to the EEC or to the EU resulted from a 
volitional act, not from imposition by force, as rightly stressed by Mario Losano.28 
Despite all the fears that a possible resurgence of Germany caused among its former 
political adversaries, or maybe because of it, when the new German political autonomy 
emerged– the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) – the founders of the Benelux 
countries, together with France, the FRG and Italy, decided in 1952 to put together the 
industrial means that traditionally supported military apparatus, creating the European 
Coal and Steal Community (ECSC), and thus the first European community.  
In the same year, the same countries tried to go further and integrate their own 
military apparatuses and this led to the signing of the Treaty of Paris, creating the 
second European community – The European Defence Community (EDC) – which never 
came into being as it was rejected by the French Parliament.  
This event strengthened the importance of NATO and, once the North American “shield” 
was secured, Europe was able to engage in economic development.  
In 1958 and through the Treaty of Rome, the six ECSC countries signed the European 
Economic Community treaty (EEC) which would lead to the creation of a common 
economic area. In the same year, another means of making war – the atom – was held 
in common by the EURATOM treaty, and this meant the existence of three European 
communities. Since then, the ECC continued to widen and deepen.  
This was an unparalleled historical construction whose achievements are undeniable 
and unprecedented in the European continent, and whose assumptions remained 
unaltered until the political earthquake of 1989. There had never been such prosperity 
and cooperation among Europeans for so long. It seemed that the inter-state conflict 
had definitely been put away, the same applying to war.  
                                                      
26  It must be pointed out that the difference is formal rather than real. The political-strategic blocks of the 
Cold War had their Leader State, and many of the weaker members had, indeed, limited sovereignty. 
27  Losano, Mario G. (2006). “Il Mondo secondo Hitler”, in Limes. Rivista italiana di geopolitica, n. 5: 238. 
28  Losano, Mario, op. cit: 248. 
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But in 1989 the world changed. As usual, at the time people only spoke about the 
“dividends of peace” and of radiant tomorrows. The spectacular move back of the 
Soviet Union covered the profound change that occurred in Europe. In fact, and despite 
arising old fears in France, the United Kingdom and Russia, the same fears that in 1907 
had led to the “Triple Entente”, to the cooperation between France and Russia in the 
1930s and the occupation of Germany after 1945 (Mitterrand even nurtured the dream 
of cooperating with Gorbachev to prevent the reunification of Germany, under the 
complacent eyes of Mrs. Thatcher29), Germany was reunited in the wake of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall.  
In a profoundly altered international context, the European project that had started as 
a great “Zollverein” (name of the customs union created in 1834 in Germany under the 
aegis of Prussia and which ultimately facilitated the creation of the Second Reich), 
albeit with the purpose of “pacifying” Germany and make war unthinkable, was actually 
transformed into the European Union in Maastricht in 1992. 
Europe’s impotence before the Yugoslavian crisis – the cacophony had began right after 
the unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the new reunited Germany – 
pushed the proponents of the European idea and of the old continent as a global player 
to new leaps forward. The theoretical advances made in Amsterdam, Helsinki, Nice and 
finally, in Lisbon, allowed the creation of a facade of a political leadership, a caricature 
of common foreign policy, as well as a kind of military structure aimed at lesser tasks – 
the Petersberg tasks. 
Compared with the major success of the EEC, the Union’s integration ambitions have 
not produced brilliant results. By incorporating a broader range of countries – with 
often quite diverse traditions, cultures, interests, loyalties and hostilities - and by trying 
to extend its action beyond economic cooperation, the EU, and forgive the simplification 
made here for analytical purposes, faces two basic dilemmas: either it undertakes the 
policy agreed by its most powerful members or, due to the wide divergence of a few 
national and regional interests, it limits itself, as a rule, to govern by consensus, that 
is, by the lowest common denominator.30 
Also the method adopted so far in European integration – a “top down” decision that 
excludes the supposedly unenlightened masses – seems to have reached its limits, as 
those masses increasingly demand to be heard. However, when consulted, they 
frequently invalidate the development of European integration, often, it must be 
stressed, to “punish” their national governments. This does not help matters, rather 
favouring the re-nationalization of policies and the rebirth of national selfishness. Only 
the great unifying events appear to be able to revive the faith of the Europeans, but the 
reality and creativity of the people insist on failing to come up with them.  
Rather, the recent financial crisis exposed a number of structural weaknesses and 
brought to the surface the various “Europes” that underlie the theoretical constructs. 
Oversimplifying for purposes of analysis ( the reality is too complex and multifaceted to 
be addressed in an article of this size), basically we are in the presence of a cold, 
protestant and economically flourishing Northern Europe that, having taken enormous 
                                                      
29  Kissinger, Henry (1996). Diplomacia, Lisboa: Gradiva: 100-102. 
30  The analogy with the Confederation Helvetica, which cautiously maintains its neutrality, balancing the 
centrifugal forces that inevitably result from an alignment that unpleased one of its language minorities, 
has come to the mind of many people.  
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advantages of the single currency, has been refusing solidarity to what it perceives as 
the chaotic southern countries, which, with the blindness that characterizes those who 
do not value forecasting and planning31, lived in the illusion they were Northern without 
being so and relinquished their most basic means of production, adopting lifestyles that 
were not theirs, while squandering a wealth they did not possess.  
A third “Europe”, even more continental and ingrown, always fearful of Russia (due to 
the weight of history and the geographical position) lies to the East and tends to yield 
to German interests, while viewing with concern the growing links between Germany 
and Russia that raise old historical ghosts, seeming to believe a lot more in the 
eventual North American protection than in European solidarity and its incipient defence 
mechanisms.32 
These fears are not confined to Eastern Europe. Indeed, what is happening on a global 
level seems to justify these worries. On that aspect, difficulties also seem to favour old 
selfishness and the return of power politics that are their inevitable consequence. In 
1904, Halford Mackinder theorized in a classic text of geopolitical thinking33 that an 
alliance between Germany and Russia would create such a combination of power that 
the maritime powers would find themselves excluded from Eurasia. The United 
Kingdom and the U.S. fought against this nightmare in World War I, and it is legitimate 
to assume that it was to stop it from occurring again that the United States intervened 
in Europe from 1942. NATO, which was geopolitically justified by Mackinder in 1943,34 
served the same purpose again. Currently, in the face of a Russian geopolitical school 
that aims to rebuild the empire and the rebirth of the “pan-isms”,35 the European have 
obvious reasons to worry again, especially when the U.S. seems unconcerned with 
European affairs. How long for?  
In this scenario, Europe gets distracted with financial matters and lacks the energy and 
vision to look after its much battered union. Enlargement is no longer part of the 
rhetoric and there is the suspected perception that it would bring more problems than 
benefits, as it could import into the Union fractures and rivalries that could make 
current problems even more difficult to solve. Accordingly, the old divisions become, 
again, very clear and rooted, at least in part, in the cultural and geographical factors 
explained earlier. Even if these are mere perceptions and not concrete realities, the 
difference is not that big. Is there hope for Europe or will the old ghosts return?  
What is happening in Hungary (let us also recall the split of Czechoslovakia), in Finland, 
Denmark (which unilaterally revoked the Schengen Agreement) and, in a distinct way, 
in Belgium, gives great cause for caution. Ethnicity and History are being brought back 
with a vengeance not only by nationalist parties, even in Germany, where the failure of 
multiculturalism has been proclaimed and German citizenship laws that recall the 
darkest periods in recent history have been enacted. We must not forget that in 1944, 
when not even the propaganda could hide the disastrous course of war for Germany, an 
                                                      
31   According to Hall’s criteria with regard to the organization of time, societies are divided into 
“monochronic “(where the organization of time is sequential and activities take place according to an 
organized chronological flow) and “polychronic” (where there is the tendency to carry out several 
activities simultaneously without prior ordering the sequence). Hall, Edward (1993), Understanding 
Cultural Differences - Germans, French and Americans, Yarmouth: Maine. 
32  Friedman, George (2011). Visegrad: A new European Military Force, STRATFOR, 17 Maio. 
33  Mackinder, Halford J. (1904). “The Geographical Pivot of History” in Geographical Journal 23. 
34  Mackinder, Halford J. (1943). “The Round World and the winning of peace” in Foreign Affairs nº 2. 
35  Dugin, Alexandr (2010). The Great War of the Continents, Antagonista (original from 2005). 
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article entitled “The end of Europe?” published in the magazine of the German Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs Berlin Rom Tokio stressed that whatever the organization of Europe 
after the conflict, Germany would remain a Directing State or Guiding State, at the risk 
of the breakup of Europe.36  
 
Is this what we are seeing? 
Both Helmuths (Kohl and Schmidt), who ruled Germany for 24 years, feared that 
future. Convinced that the leaders after them (and not only in Germany) would forget 
the war and return to the nationalism of the nineteenth century, they recommended 
the acceleration of the European integration as a panacea against further disaster. 
Schmidt went even further: in his view, Germany should never have nuclear weapons, 
nor belong to the UN Security Council, as the country had shown only too well what it 
was capable of when given a free rein”.37 
It was not even necessary to wait long. Selfishness did not take time to surface. As 
early as in 1991, during the first Iraq War, Kohl himself refused to consider a missile 
attack on Turkey as an attack on NATO,38 refusing the solidarity that turns strength 
into an alliance. Shortly afterwards, as mentioned earlier, Germany, without any 
consultation with its partners, unilaterally recognized the independence of Croatia and 
Slovenia and adopted a policy that favoured its own economic interests, a situation 
that was particularly clear in the Balkans. However, candour has its limits, and in May 
2010,  President Kholer was forced to resign after declaring, in Afghanistan, that the 
intervention of German armed forces had the purpose of protecting German economic 
interests.39 
Indeed, it is very difficult to counter the deep forces that may only be evaded with 
patience and perseverance. This lesson has been frustratingly difficult to learn by those 
who, by ignoring them, act like children on the beach and build sand castles convinced 
that they will withstand the force of the tide.  
In a continent that invented the nation-state and continues to be carved up into 
multiple sovereignties,40 where the selfishness of citizens is expressed democratically 
and has the force of law, top volunteer unions have a difficult time surviving, although, 
of course, nothing is impossible. The process of European Integration – whatever form 
it will end up having - in addition to a mobilizing ideal that goes beyond mere economic 
issues (a new negative association formed due to the fear of others is obviously never 
excluded), needs time and can only be attained throughout several generations. It also 
requires that the basic purposes of the state – ensuring Security and Welfare – may be 
undertaken in a climate of tranquillity, peaceful coexistence and domestic prosperity.  
Clearly, the future of Europe, in purely theoretical terms, has several solutions. 
Without wishing to make a comprehensive analysis of all possible variants, I shall focus 
on just three possibilities: the first, which was unthinkable only a few years ago, is the 
                                                      
36  Losano, Mario, “Il Mondo secondo Hitler”,  cit: 243-247. 
37  Cutileiro, José (2010). “O Mundo dos Outros – Natal em Março” in Expresso, 23 Dezembro. 
38  Huntington, Samuel P. (1999). The Clash of Civilizations, Portuguese version Gradiva: Lisbon: 162. 
39  New York Times-Europe, 31 May, 2010 
40  The level of cohesion, which is the highest inside the clan, decreases as the social basis expands, and 
reaches its lowest level among nations, a level where usually the most efficient aggregating cement is 
the existence of a common enemy.  
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end of the Union. Whether it takes the form of a return to the nationalist policies of the 
nineteenth century, or whether it ends up limiting the Union to a club of the richest 
countries, the tendency for the come back, this time quite openly, of the Directing 
States41 will be inevitable. No doubt that the “natural” geopolitical groupings would be 
favoured by this solution. The question is the fate of the weakest links: reduced to a 
condition of states with limited sovereignty in the worst style of the vision of Carl 
Schimtt, they could attempt to get together in natural geopolitical groups, although 
such a future is unlikely due to the large differences that continue to exist among 
them.  Poverty is a bad counsellor.... Still within the previous scenario, there is also 
the possibility of seeking external solidarity, something which is believed to be more 
realistic in the case of states with historical ties outside Europe. The United Kingdom 
(which is not part of the single currency) is a clear example of that possibility, thanks 
to its special connection to the U.S. and its traditional policy of separation from 
continental politics, whose hegemonies it has almost always fought against. A sharp 
European decline may lead some states of the current Union to tread the paths of the 
past again.  
Another possibility is, of course, the deepening of the Union according to the federal 
model, surpassing the inter-governmental model that has shown a strong tendency 
towards the Directing State of group of Directing Sates, as aimed by the “founding 
fathers”. This solution might allow going beyond the Post-Modern Sate42 which, after 
all, in practice perpetuated the notion that, whereas all states are equal, some are 
more equal than others. This solution might also provide an answer to the poor 
solidarity that the various “Europes” have shown to each other and would require at 
least an economic governance of the Union.  
However, there is another alternative, which is strongly provocative but equally 
promising: I insisted earlier on the strength of infra-national forms of social 
organization. Not without reason, as they underlie all societies and are present in 
states that are too big to deal with small things and too small to address large issues, 
which means that local issues tend to gain strength, albeit in a different form.43 Maybe 
because of precisely that, it is necessary to go beyond the nation-state, even the post-
modern state, and go back to some form of tribe and localness (in history, recurrences 
never take the same form), which, in a confusing and tentative way, are emerging 
without a geopolitical rationale that confers them consistency, at least for now. If, to 
this, we add the undeniable internal change that European policies caused within the 
states, the habits of free-movement, the clear dispute among transnational groups for 
the monopoly of power of states, whether they are financial groups, social or opinion 
movements, then we may have the fertile melting pot that encourages change.  
Could the continent that invented the nation-state also declare its death? Is 
cooperation possible by consensus of values and culture, as a recent work intended, 
                                                      
41  Remember the words of President Cavaco Silva in October 2011 in his speech at the University Institute 
of Florence.  
42  Concept defended by Robert Cooper, among others, in The Post-Modern State and the World Order, 
Demos, 2000). 
43  Topic addressed by various authors: Among other, see the excellent paper by Ana Margarida Roldão, “Da 
Europa das Nações à Europa das Regiões” in Informação Internacional, Análise Económica e Política, 
coord. by José Félix Ribeiro, Ministry of Planning, Forecasting and Planning Department, vol I, 2001: 307-
335, or Aymeric Chauprade, Géopolitique… cit: 810- 833. 
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albeit with huge gaps, to have been the model that prevailed in ancient Greece?44 Is 
peace attainable by simple consensus, by “complex interdependence” (I took the 
liberty to refer to the ideas of Nye and Keohane45) without a strong hegemony project? 
Or is it that the so-called thinkers of the “realist” school are right and the deep forces 
condition human nature to such an extent that we are doomed to repeating ourselves?  
It is important to reflect, albeit briefly, on the role of Portugal in this stage of 
intertwined interests. Portugal is one of the oldest countries in Europe and indeed, the 
one with the oldest borders. Never having suffered from secessionist attempts – even 
when it had more than one political power, they fought for the same central power46 – 
it may well be said that it enjoys from an enviable degree of national cohesion, a 
quality all the more remarkable as it is not based on any marking geographical 
differentiation (if we exclude its position), but primarily on linguistic and cultural 
factors. However, this position deserves further thought.  
Indeed, it was Portugal’s position that enabled its maritime vocation (although it 
obviously did not determine it). It is due to its position that Portugal has a more benign 
climate than most of the Iberian mini-continent and it is also thanks to its position that 
the country has become, from very early on, a platform for supporting the maritime 
powers that since then, directly or indirectly, ruled it. As a southern country, although 
tempered by the strong influence of its Atlantic coastline, Portugal boasts the majority 
of defects and qualities of the people of the South, including polychronism (associated 
with the traditional “desenrascanço”, that is, the capacity to” pull a macgyver” and 
always come up with a solution to a problem at the last minute with no advanced 
planning and no resources). 
 Ranked by Hofstede among the countries with the greatest “Power Distance”, 
Femininity”, “Collectivism” and having also a great need to develop mechanisms for 
“Control of Uncertainty”47 which, according to the social psychologist, are rooted in its 
Roman heritage, during a particular time in history Portugal was able to carry out with 
notable constancy and determination an expansion that still amazes today, and to build 
intercultural and inter-ethnic bridges held until the present day.48 
Persistently poor in natural resources, it lived for centuries out of the exploitation of 
the resources in its territories outside Europe, and when that possibility came to an 
end, it soon turned to Europe, in defiance of a tradition of many centuries. As a recent 
convert, it zealously pursued the objectives of common practices and went further than 
most European states in dismantling its primary sector, which puts it in a particularly 
vulnerable position before the crisis faced by the Union.  
Historically linked to the sea, over the last decades the country has been run mainly by 
former emigrants blinded by the European mirage and for whom the sea represented 
the nostalgia of the Empire. Accordingly, a formerly relatively large merchant and 
                                                      
44  Low, Polly (2007). Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
45   Keohane, Robert and Nye,  Joseph (1977). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
Boston, Little, Brown and Company. 
46  Nogueira, José M. Freire (2004). As guerras Liberais – Uma reflexão Estratégica sobre a História de 
Portugal, Lisboa: Cosmos/IDN: 289-290. 
47  www.tamas.com/samples/.../Hofstede_Hall.pdf, acceded on 23-09-2011 
48  Particularly stressed by the Brazilian Freyre, Gilberto (2001) Casa Grande e Senzala, Lisbon: Livros do 
Brasil (original from 1933). 
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fishing fleet associated with the ship building and repair industry disappeared, perhaps 
for a long time.  
Recently, the country seems to have rediscovered the sea. Endowed with a huge EEZ 
that it wasted and whose rights are in part in the hands of the EU (article 3 of Title I – 
Domains and Competencies of the Union, Treaty of Lisbon), Portugal advocates the 
extension of its continental shelf, which, somehow nurturing some megalomania, 
would multiply the country by 40! However, for the time being, the exploitation of such 
vast resources is merely rhetoric.  Whereas the political statements, conferences and 
opinion pieces abound, concrete actions are missing.  
Mismanaged in general terms, and living from loans (a nineteen century tradition that 
came strong into the twentieth century until the Estado Novo, and which was taken up 
by the Third Republic…) the country cannot, actually, dream about independent 
policies, let alone in an area where the appetites of the “great” of Europe will not fail to 
manifest. The great ocean where untold riches lie appears intended to becoming a 
bargaining chip against other vital forms of support, regardless of where they come 
from.49 
Indeed, Portugal does not seem to do very well in any of the evolution scenarios 
proposed. The end of the Union will certainly not be the end of Portugal, but the re-
nationalization of some policies will probably lead to association. If such a catastrophic 
scenario leads to the splintering of the Spanish state, an Iberian federalism might 
eventually come to the fore and, within it, a state, which at least in name, will be 
Portugal.50 But that state will perhaps have its extra-European links intact, in a way 
that no putative Hispanic nation can match. Can we get round history?  
Perhaps the best solution for Portugal is the reinforcement of the European Union via 
de federal route. I have expressed my strong reservations about this scenario in terms 
of geopolitical bias, but it is not impossible. A sort of European “Arkansas” (but 
bringing a huge maritime area and transcontinental affinities with it, and guaranteed 
the representation of the minorities underlying a federal model) is obviously better 
than the tiny state51 which we may be doomed to becoming with the demise of the 
European project.  
Portugal seems to do comparatively better in the third hypothesis. Due to its small size 
and cohesion, the country would be a natural region with sufficient critical mass in a 
Europe of regions, perhaps greater than that which Belgium currently has in the 
Europe of Nations.  
Finally, and moving to the reign of utopia, and since it cannot counteract its physical 
geography, the country could, nevertheless, become an European part of an entity 
formed by various continents, as indeed the clever Talleyrand advised the count of 
                                                      
49  For a thorough analysis of the Geopolitics of Portugal see Nogueira, José M. F., O Método Geopolítico 
Alargado… cit, passim. 
50 Ambassador Franco Nogueira foresaw a similar situation in the book in which he said farewell to politics 
and life, writing that “the failure of the Common Market would, first and foremost, be the Iberian 
common market, that is, a common market between two very unequal partners, one of which, three or 
four times stronger, would easily dominate the other. It would be the Peninsular Common Market, 
dominated by the will and the power of the stronger partner, and we all known that economic domination 
is followed by political domination”. Nogueira, Franco (1993). Juízo Final, Barcelos: Livraria Civilização: 
39. 
51  According to the definition by Moreira, Adriano (2009). A Circunstância do Estado Exíguo, Lisbon: 
Almedina. 
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Palmela during the Vienna Conference in 1815 with regard to the future status of 
Brazil.52 History is far from over… 
This paper asks more questions than provides answers, but finding them with realism, 
rejecting determinism and thinking out of the box is the responsibility of today’s 
European elites, where the Portuguese ones are included. Failure could costs us all 
much more than what we can afford to pay. 
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